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The continuation of China’s remarkable economic growth will depend on continued 
increases in electricity supply.  China has commenced a program of electricity sector 
restructuring, with the announced aim of relying on markets and competition to provide 
incentives for attracting private investment and encouraging efficiency.  However, a close 
examination of the generation markets being created suggests that truly free wholesale 
prices are likely to be both high and volatile.  This may be the reason that these prices 
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 1.0 Introduction 
 
  The continued success of China’s rapidly growing economy and the 
accompanying economic reforms will depend in no small measure on continued growth 
in the electricity sector.  In an effort to attract private investment into the sector – 
especially the generation component of the sector – and to insure the efficient use of that 
investment, the Chinese government has undertaken a major and fundamental electricity 
sector restructuring, including the now standard reform strategy of the separation of the 
assets and operations of generation from those of transmission and distribution.  The 
contemplated outcome includes a generation sector characterized by independent 
enterprises competing among each other for access to the transmission grid and so for 
customers, with free wholesale prices both insuring that the most efficient generation 
assets are called into production and providing a return to the owners of those assets. 
 
  However, it is not at all clear how realistic or likely this contemplated outcome is, 
either politically or economically.  Politically, the Chinese government has so far been 
unwilling to allow either wholesale or retail electricity prices to increase in line with 
increases in costs, most notably increases in the price of coal; as in Russia, for example, 
the government has continued to regard the prices of electricity and other public services 
as a weapon for fighting inflation rather than as a mechanism of resource allocation.  
Economically, certain aspects of the electricity sector that are not likely to change quickly 
– especially the heavy dependence on coal generation and the limited interregional 
transmission capacity – may render generation competition difficult, volatile, and 
ineffectual at achieving the goals of restructuring. 
 
  In this paper we outline the basic inherited structure of the Chinese electricity 
sector as well as the overall reform plans and the progress achieved to date.  We then 
examine closely the six primary regional markets that are considered by the government 
as likely to be the loci of wholesale competition when it appears.  We discuss why 
competition may be ineffective in these markets and consider policies with the potential 
to make beneficial reform outcomes more likely. 
 
2.0  The Chinese Electricity Sector 
 
2.1  Background 
 
The Chinese electric power industry has grown into the second largest in the 
world, with installed capacity rising from 1.85 GW in 1949 to 713.29 GW in 2007, an 
average annual growth rate of 10.8 percent.
1  The vast majority of generation plants are 
either coal powered – almost 78 percent of total capacity in 2007 – or hydro powered – 
over 20 percent. Nuclear plants account for only about 1 percent of capacity. Although 
the Chinese electricity industry has been expanding dramatically, per capita installed 
capacity is still at a low level of 0.5 KW, and per capita annual electricity consumption in 
                                                 
1 See the websites of the China Electricity Council, www.cec.org.cn, and State Power Information 
Network, www.sp.com.cn/zgdl/dltj/default.htm.     2
2006 was only around 2149 KWh.
2  In the long run, a massive expansion of power 
infrastructure will still be needed if average consumption is to approach world levels. 
  
When China began its transformation from a centrally planned to a market-
oriented economy in 1978, the already rapidly growing demand for electricity suggested 
the crucial nature of reforms in the electricity sector. However, electricity has been one of 
the last sectors for the introduction of, and reliance on, market mechanisms.  The 
shortage of public funds and the desire for a separation of government administration 
from business were the main political reasons to launch the reforms in the electricity 
sector. In particular, the central government wanted to encourage rapid infrastructure 
expansion and improvement of power generation efficiency in the reforms undertaken 
after 1986. As the reforms are still ongoing, it is impossible to draw a simple conclusion 




One important issue going forward will be the strengthening of the rule of law in 
general and of regulation and competition law in particular.  On August 31, 2007, China 
passed its first comprehensive antimonopoly law (hereinafter the Law), to become 
effective on August 1, 2008. How to get regulatory regimes aligned with the current 
framework of the Law will be a serious challenge for policymakers. An independent 
competition commission is to be set up under the State Council to assume the main 
responsibility for investigating possible anticompetitive conduct. However, the Law does 
not state clearly how it will be applied in regulated industries.  In addition, as the Chinese 
electricity industry was originally operated by the provincial governments, their residual 
controls "die hard". Even though the market mechanism has been nominally introduced 
into the reforms and its use is one of the stated main objectives of the policymakers, the 
central government continues to exercise extensive investment planning and social policy 
intervention, as well as price controls, in electricity and the other strategic energy sectors. 
The Law does not state how an enforcement agency is to deal with such an 
“administrative monopoly”, and this raises critical questions regarding its 
implementation.
4      
 
2.2  The structure of the Chinese electricity sector 
 
We begin with the introduction of the players in the Chinese electricity market, 
followed by a discussion of the fuel structure and of the transmission and distribution of 
the electricity industry. We will also discuss barriers to entry, especially for foreign 




                                                 
2 Office of the National Energy Leading Group (2007) at http://www.chinaenergy.gov.cn/news_20866.html 
3 Detailed discussions of the history and current status of Chinese electricity reforms include Berrah, et al.  
(2001), Development Research Center (2002), Xu (2004), Yeoh and Rajaraman (2004), Zhang and Heller 
(2004), IEA (2006), Xu and Chen (2006), Yang (2006), and State Council (2007). 
4 See Zhang and Zhang (2007), Deng and Leonard (2008), and Wen (2008).   3
2.2.1 The players 
 
The incumbent monopoly generator, transmitter, and distributor of electricity, the 
State Power Corporation (SPC), was broken up in late 2002. The generation assets of the 
SPC were divided into five generation companies:  Huaneng Group, Huadian Power, 
Guodian Power, Datang Power Group and China Power Investment Company.  Each of 
the generation companies was designed to control no more than 20 percent of China's 
national generation capacity.  The transmission grid was separated from generation 
operations and then further separated into two power grid operators, the State Power Grid 
Company and the South China Power Grid Company. Transmission and distribution are 
to continue to be regulated monopolies, with power supplied from a competitive 
generation sector. 
 
The State Electric Regulatory Commission (SERC) was established in March 2003 to 
oversee the power industry and to issue licenses to environmentally qualified operators. 
SERC is the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Regulatory Energy Commission (FERC), 
through it is currently limited to regulating only the electricity industry (while FERC 
covers a wider range of energy industries). It is expected that, over time, other energy 
sectors will be overseen by SERC. SERC is also in charge of proposing amendments to 
the electric power law and drafting regulations on competition in the electricity market. It 
is the first regulatory commission in the public utilities sector, and it is also in the process 
of helping the seven state-run operators (five generation companies and two power grid 
operators) to adopt modern corporate governance practices. 
     
The powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the 
government’s primary economic policymaking and planning agency.  It is the institution 
charged with formulating strategic and long-term plans for development of the electricity 
sector, planning the spatial distribution of major electricity investment projects, and 
arranging state investment funds for infrastructure. It also examines electricity prices and 
formulates, monitors, and enforces the government’s pricing policy. Allocating tariff 
regulation to a broad government policy body like NDRC rather than a sectoral regulator 
like SERC is unique to China. This transitional arrangement may be intended to last only 
until the SERC has demonstrated the capacity to successfully establish and put into 
operation electricity markets, in addition to administering its other functions. This 
arrangement also allows the NDRC to maintain ultimate control over tariffs instead of 
ceding that power to an independent body before the transitional issues are addressed 
(e.g. stranded costs and cross subsidies). 
 
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) takes the responsibility of establishing a financial 
management system, monitoring costs, and carrying out financial inspections for the 
state-owned enterprises in the electricity sector. It also establishes a taxation policy for 
the sector. 
 
Other institutions and organizations also participate into the regulatory framework of 
the electricity industry.  The environmental protection agency is the institution that 
enforces environmental laws, regulations and standards. The technical supervision   4
agency stipulates and enforces technical and safety standards and regulations. The State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is responsible for 
supervising and administrating state-owned assets. 
 
The current market structure of the power industry and its governmental regulatory 
departments is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Electricity demand is dominated by the industrial sector, which accounted for 
over 75 percent of total power consumption in 2007.  Residential and commercial 
consumption account for just under 11 percent and 9 percent, respectively. Unlike some 
other developing countries, agricultural consumption of electricity in China is relatively 
quite small, accounting for only 4 percent.
5 
 
Some large industrial customers have their own fixed power suppliers for 
historical reasons.  In addition, the NDRC is gradually increasing the freedom of 
industrial customers to choose particular generation sources in their regions. Especially in 
Guangdong province, some industry consumers are allowed to organize and build up 
their own thermal generators.  The largest power consumers have more and more power 
to influence generation decisions. 
 
2.2.2 Fuel structure 
 
The Chinese electricity generation market has been experiencing rapid demand 
growth since the mid 1980s due to both high-speed economic growth and increasing 
living standards. By 2007, total generation capacity reached 713.29 GW, with system 
capacity increasing roughly by 60 GW each year between 2003 and 2007.  Total 
generation capacity of 660 GW is projected by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-
2010) and 1080 GW by 2020. 
 
China is a coal- and hydro-rich country. In fact, it has the world's largest 
exploitable coal and hydropower capacities.  As a result, coal and hydro are the two 
largest components in the country's electricity generation fuel structure (Figure 2). As of 
2007, 77.73 percent of total generation capacity was powered by coal, and 20.36 percent 
by hydro. In 1992, China introduced nuclear power as part of its fuel structure. As of 
now, nuclear power contributes only about 1 percent of the nation's total generation 
capacity. Plans to expand nuclear power have not been very successful due to high costs 
and lack of funding. However, according to an official of the Electricity Designing 
Institute of the State Power Corporation, the country's nuclear power generation capacity 
will grow to 36-37 GW, which will account for roughly 4 percent of China's total 
generation capacity, by 2020. 
 
Resource development and utilization are major challenges for the Chinese 
government, since the country's fuel resources are located predominantly in the northern 
and western parts of the country while major load centers are located in the eastern 
coastal areas. Although coal-based generation will remain dominant in the near future, 
                                                 
5 http://www.china.com.cn/economic/zhuanti/08jjbg/2008-01/31/content_9624958.htm.    5
hydropower will play an increasingly important role in the generation fuel structure. This 
is largely due to the Chinese government's commitment to develop the relatively 
underdeveloped hydro-rich western region and the adverse impact that coal generation 
has on the environment. China also plans to include natural gas in its electricity fuel 
structure. The capacity of natural gas generation is planed to reach 36 GW by 2010.
6  
 
2.2.3 Transmission and distribution 
 
As of 2000, China had 707,142 km of transmission lines of 35kV and above in 
operation. Formally there have been seven regional networks (Northeast, Northwest, 
North, East, Central, South, and Guangdong) and five provincial networks (Shandong, 
Fujian, Xinjiang, Hainan, and Tibet). Currently, the South China Power Grid controls 
transmission and distribution networks in the southern regions (Southwest plus 
Guangdong), while the State Power Grid controls in the rest of the country. The standard 
frequency of the electricity system is 50 Hz. 
 
In some rural regions, there also exist regional independent distribution companies, 
which might have their own generation plants or purchase electricity directly from the 
national grid. These independent distribution companies mainly concentrate in areas 
where there are small hydro generators. They might also have their own transmission 
network, where it is not convenient or economical for the national grid to supply energy. 
 
The fragmented heritage of the national transmission grid has made and will 
continue to make the integration of regional wholesale markets a challenge for the 
government.  Another challenge, in light of the different locations of resources and 
electricity demand, is the transmission of resources and power broadly from West to East.  
This is also connected with a broader government policy of increasing development in 




The Chinese government hopes to create a unified national power grid network by 
2020. The West-East Electricity Transfer Project, as proposed in the 10th Five-Year Plan, 
requires the construction of three major west-east transmission corridors: North, Central, 
and South. The transmission capacity of each corridor is expected to reach 20 GW in 
2020. 
 
The North corridor portion of the project covers three regional power networks 
(Northwest, North and Northeast) and the Shandong provincial power network. This 
corridor can transmit power up to 620 miles; it is mainly made up of AC transmission 
lines. The construction and expansion of the North corridor is expected to help the 
development of Shanxi, west Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia coal power bases. 
 
                                                 
6 http://www.hwcc.gov.cn/nsbd/NewsDisplay.asp?Id=166518.  
7 A dissenting view suggests that a continued role for the Western provinces as raw materials supplier to 
the industrial East will only entrench and exacerbate the subsidiary role of the former.  See Oakes (2004).   6
The Central corridor portion covers three regional power networks (Sichuan-
Chongqing, Central, and East) and the Fujian provincial power network. It is composed 
mainly of DC transmission lines and can transfer power between 620 and 1,370 miles. 
The construction of the Three Gorges, the Jinshajiang, and the Sichuan hydropower 
stations is the direct result of developing the Central corridor. 
 
The South corridor mainly covers one regional power network (South) and the 
Hainan provincial power networks. This corridor uses both AC and DC transmission and 
can send power between 620 and 930 miles. The main purpose of the expansion of the 
South corridor is to transfer power into Guangdong province, which is one of the major 
load centers. The development of hydropower stations along several rivers in the South 
corridor will aid in achieving this goal. 
 
2.2.4  Barriers to entry 
 
    Although the Chinese government has improved market conditions for investment in 
the power sector, significant barriers still exist for non-state investors, especially foreign 
investors.  These include 
 
    •   Risk. Foreign investors perceive higher economic, political, and legal risks than the 
government acknowledges. Although these investors are generally optimistic about the 
future market in China, they often mention that the ratio of profitability to risk is higher 
in other countries. 
    •   Return on investment.  Despite its professed desire to rely on market forces, the 
Chinese government continues to closely regulate electricity generation, generally 
allowing a 12 to 15 percent rate of return on investment in these and other infrastructure 
projects. Foreign investors expect higher rates based on the perceived risks mentioned 
above. Few foreign companies will invest in any large project if return on investment is 
less than 15 percent, even at their own domestic facilities. 
    •   Complexity. Foreign investors may not be comfortable with, or even familiar with, 
the complex project-approval process in China. Approval is required from many 
governmental agencies at different levels, each of which takes time and money. This 
process is not transparent to newcomers. 
    •   Legal issues. Foreign investors are not confident that the Chinese legal system will 
be unbiased in the event of a dispute with local counterparts. They also worry about the 
enforcement of contracts with power grid operators and fuel suppliers. The negotiation of 
power-purchasing agreements has thus been difficult and time-consuming.
8 
    •   High tariffs and taxes.  Foreign investors expect low import tariffs and tax rates. 
Import tariffs for power units smaller than 350 MW are 38 percent, though larger units 
are taxed at only 6 percent. High income taxes also reduce net profit. While the 
government has reduced import tariffs in recent years, some favorable policies enjoyed 
                                                 
8  “Broader institutional weaknesses, of which corporate governance, limited contract enforcement, and 
weak intellectual property rights provide particularly relevant examples, … endanger future growth, 
especially in sectors that build on the accumulation and exchange of advanced technologies.”  (Brandt, 
Rawski, and Sutton, 2008)   7
by foreign investors, including tax deductions and exemption policies, have been 
abolished. 
    •   Lack of mutual understanding. Chinese and foreign partners often lack a mutual 
understanding of each other's culture and business practices, hindering cooperative 
projects. Both sides need more experience cooperating in the electric power market. 
 
For domestic investors, the barriers to entry are not as serious as for foreign 
investors, because the legal framework of Chinese Electricity Law includes certain 
provisions designed to facilitate entry. As the NDRC emphasized, for those who apply 
for the licenses and are technologically adapted to the network, licensing authorities have 
a maximum of only thirty days for investigation. After this time limit, either the licenses 
are issued, or the authorities are required to issue refusal announcements and 
explanations. 
 
2.2.5 Price  regulation 
 
In order to encourage investment in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the central 
government established a special tariff paid to all newly developed generators. For older 
power plants built before 1985 with state grants covering the costs of equipment and 
construction, the generation price was set by the NDRC in an orthodox way that covered 
only the operating cost of power plants and transmission and distribution. However, the 
reformed policy fixed a tariff formula for new generation capacity on a cost-plus basis 
which guaranteed a 12-15 percent rate of return and offered an accelerated capital 
repayment schedule, usually over only ten years for plants with a much longer lifetime. 
The reform acknowledged that electricity produced by new capacity would be more 
costly than that from the older, nationally financed plants because the latter had incurred 
no or subsidized capital costs and often benefited from cheaper fuel supplies under 
central planning. In effect, the new policy allowed wholesale prices to be set individually 
on the basis of the approved cost of a power plant or even of an individual generating 
unit. For new plants, nearly as many generation prices were adopted as there were new 
plants or units. Table 1 illustrates the cost-tariff relationship of one representative power 
plant in Guangdong Province. Table 2 presents the national averages of these two tracks 
of generation prices. 
  
In 1999, the SPC began to experiment with wholesale market competition among 
generators on a very limited basis in six provinces. The experience followed a very crude 
English power pool model. Typically, each province selected a certain number of power 
producers to participate in a limited competition that served only a small fraction of 
market demand. The bulk of demand continued to be met by the planned dispatch, with 
reductions in dispatch caused by oversupply allocated to all power producers in 
proportion to their existing generation. Even power companies with power purchasing 
agreements (PPAs) were forced to reduce their contracted off-take hours. Essentially, the 
power generators forced to participate were the twelve largest independent power 
producers (IPPs). For each, the total power capacity was divided into a contractual 
amount and a smaller (typically 10 percent) that was forced to compete. The contractual 
amount was dispatched as usual every day at the politically set price. The 10 percent   8
beyond the contractual amount was bid into the grid at market price. The IPPs were free 
to make their own decisions whether to compete or not on a daily basis. 
 
Simulation of competition began in July 2000, with no actual financial 
settlements. The experiment of wholesale market competition was generally 
inconsequential because its scope was extremely limited and the experiment was halted 
as soon as the power markets became tighter in 2001, alleviating the pressure on power 
producers to lower prices or compete for dispatch on the grid. 
 
Finally in 2002 and 2003, the State Council issued several policy statements 
concerning electricity price regulation, which summarized the results of the experiment 
and provided a preliminary framework for future wholesale competition.
9 In March 2005, 
the NDRC issued three interim provisions for the regulation of wholesale, retail, and 
power transmission and distribution prices, which are the milestones for the new pricing 
regime in the Chinese electricity industry.
10 In this new price scheme, the NDRC decided 
to implement a structure of two-part electricity prices after generation competition was 
applied in the wholesale market. This two-part electricity price consists of a capacity 
price and a system marginal price. The capacity price is determined by the price 
administrative department of the government, while the system marginal price is set 
through market competition. The government will use a cost-plus formula in the 
calculation of the capacity power price. The wholesale price will thus be linked directly 
to fuel cost. As for the retail price, the government will control it during the early stages 
of this new price scheme but has stated its intention to allow retail prices to be 
determined by market forces after distribution activities are separated from retailing 
activities. Under such a new price scheme, competition would be encouraged and 
expanded in the wholesale market and be gradually introduced into the retail market.  
 
3.0  Competition in Generation 
 
  It is clear that an important component of the Chinese electricity restructuring 
plan as stated and publicized is the creation of competition among generation companies.  
The “Plan for the Reform of the Electric Power System” issued by the State Council in 
April 2002 calls for unbundling generation from transmission and distribution in order to 
create a system of “accessing the power grid through competition”.  More recently, a 
report from the State Council titled “China’s Energy Conditions and Policies”, issued in 
December 2007, notes that “the price mechanism is the core of the market mechanism”, 
and that “the Chinese government … has propelled electricity tariff reform to ensure that 
electricity generation and selling prices are eventually formed by market competition.”  
The broad strategy of vertical separation and the creation of “upstream” competition has 
                                                 
9 See “State Council issues the reform plan for the regulation of electricity industry” (2002), available at 
http://www.china5e.com/laws/index2.htm?id=200608080001; “State Council issues the reform plan for the 
price regulation of electricity industry” (2003), available at http://www.china-
environment.cn/uploadfile/pdf/ener/7/030709%E9%9B%BB%E5%8A%9B0709.pdf. 
10 See http://www.sepc.com.cn/outer/main/viewArticle.jsp?id=6b62e762a99513fe1aa3; 
http://www.sepc.com.cn/outer/main/viewArticle.jsp?id=cc44132da3c2cb8f0fcc; 
http://www.sepc.com.cn/outer/main/viewArticle.jsp?id=04c14ecac2b39de981f2.    9
become a standard, even a “default”, strategy for the restructuring of natural monopolies 
around the world (Newbery, 1999; Pittman, 2003, 2007b; Xu, 2004). 
 
  But how realistic is this plan for China?  To begin with, what form would such 
generation competition take?  In China as in Russia (Pittman 2007a), ex ante discussions 
and analyses of generation market competition have taken existing regional designations 
as provisional geographic markets.  In China’s case these designations divide the country 
into six regions (excluding Tibet, which we also exclude from our analysis), as shown in 
Figure 3:  North, Northeast, Northwest, East, Central, and South.  In fact, also as in 
Russia, actual geographic generation markets will probably turn out to be smaller than 
these regions once real market operation begins, especially during times of peak demand 
when transmission congestion becomes likely. 
 
This is likely for two reasons.  First, historically China’s transmission system was 
highly fragmented.  It is only recently that investments in the grid have begun to address 
this situation in a serious way, and despite these investments, interconnection remains 
weak, not only among these six regions but also within them (IEA 2006).  Second, even 
the smallest of these regions, the East, is much larger than geographic generation markets 
that have been typical of countries that have already created these markets.  A recent 
example is the geographic markets found by the U.S. Department of Justice and FERC in 
their investigations of a proposed merger of electricity companies in the PJM region of 
the northeastern United States; the geographic market delineated by these agencies was 
considerably smaller than East China during periods of low demand, and during periods 
of peak demand, network congestion caused it to become smaller still.
11 
 
  For this reason, the provision of the government’s generation sector unbundling 
and restructuring plan that limited the share of any single firm in any single region to 20 
percent may not be effective in limiting firm shares in the actual geographic markets that 
come into being with the introduction of competition.  For the same reason, our analysis 
below of the competitive structure of these regions may err on the side of optimism. 
 
  However, there are other serious reasons to be concerned about the likely 
outcomes if prices and competition are freed in these markets, as is called for by the 
government’s reform strategies.  We may divide these reasons into particular aspects of 
electricity markets and particular aspects of Chinese electricity markets. 
 
  As has been noted elsewhere (Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999; Borenstein, et al., 
1999), a number of characteristics of electricity and electricity markets make it more 
difficult to create workably competitive markets in this sector than in many others; to put 
                                                 
11 See Competitive Impact Statement, U.S. v. Exelon and Public Service Enterprise Group, August 10, 
2006, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f217700/217717.htm.  For broader discussions of the 
case, see Armington, et al. (2006) and Wolak and McRae (2007). 
   10
it another way, electricity markets that appear to be competitive using the normal tools of 
industrial economics may in fact not operate competitively.
12 
 
The demand for electricity is very inelastic in the short run; this has to do with its 
essential nature as a household product, its small cost share but crucial role in 
commercial and industrial applications, and the exceeding rarity of real-time pricing, 
even for the largest industrial users.  At the same time, supply is very inelastic as capacity 
utilization nears 100 percent:  the product itself is not storable (though hydro ponds and 
pumped storage may perform this function indirectly), and unit costs tend to increase 
dramatically as one moves from baseload nuclear and coal plants, through mid-merit 
combined cycle natural gas plants, to peaking natural gas and oil plants.  The 
combination of inelastic demand and inelastic supply means that the returns to the 
anticompetitive withholding of output may be quite high. 
 
  Two additional factors exacerbate the incentives of generation firms to withhold 
output and their ability to do so.  First, wholesale electricity markets typically take the 
form of auctions or quasi-auctions, operating on hourly offering bids from generation 
firms.  This means that these firms play the competitive “game” in these markets a very 
large number of times:  24 times a day, 168 times a week, 8760 times a year.  It seems 
not unlikely that profit-seeking generation firms in such an environment will study each 
other’s behavior and learn to behave (tacitly) cooperatively rather than competitively.  
Second, the typically steep slope of the market cost curve as market capacity is 
approached and as higher cost generation units are called into production may create 
perverse incentives for firms that own both one or more of these high-cost peaking plants 
along with one or more of the much lower cost baseload plants.  If a particular gas or oil 
fired plant would be just barely profitable at a particular wholesale price level, it follows 
that shutting down that plant would sacrifice very little profit; yet if that plant operates at 
a very steep point on the industry supply curve, shutting it down could have a large 
impact on price and thus yield large inframarginal rents to the firm’s baseload plants. 
 
  Problems like these may take especially acute form in the special circumstances 
of China.  First of all, China’s dramatic economic growth has placed a large burden on 
the electric power system; the situation is generally and broadly one of new supply trying 
to catch up to rapidly growing demand.  Thus in China, as in many other developing 
countries, the most important task of electricity reforms is to attract private investment 
into the system, rather than, as in developed countries, increasing efficiency 
(Gnansoumou and Dong, 2004; Zhang and Heller, 2004).  For the same reason, freed 
electricity prices are likely to increase. 
 
But second, despite its expressed desire for markets rather than bureaucrats to 
determine outcomes, the government has thus far been unwilling to allow electricity 
prices (wholesale or retail) to increase in response to cost increases, fearing the political 
results of increased inflation (Oakes, 2004; IEA, 2006).  The best known recent example 
has been the increase in coal prices in response to high levels of demand along with 
transport bottlenecks; rather than allow the price of coal-generated electricity to increase 
                                                 
12 Lien (2008), among others, is not so pessimistic.   11
as a result, the government attacked the problem by seeking to re-regulate coal prices, as 
well as allowing generation companies to suffer a margin squeeze (Yeoh and Rajarma, 
2004; IEA, 2006).
13  More generally, “missing from plans for further reform is the 
removal of electricity price-setting authority from state control” (Yeh and Lewis, 2004). 
 
  The third problem for China is a structural one.  As noted above, cost curves in 
wholesale electricity markets tend to become fairly inelastic as market capacity levels are 
neared; still these curves tend to exhibit a classically curved shape as generation plants of 
different technologies and efficiencies are called into service.  Figure 4 shows a stylized 
example from the PJM-East region of the northeastern US discussed earlier.  The curve 
begins with a low and flat “baseload” component of nuclear and hydro plants, moves up a 
bit to baseload “coal” plants and then to natural gas fired “combined cycle plants”, finally 
increasing its slope to a virtually vertical range as gas and oil fired “efficient peakers” 
and “super peakers” are called into production.  Cost curves in many generation markets 
around the world would look more or less like this one. 
 
  But China is different.  As of 2007, 77.7 percent of China’s generation capacity is 
coal fired, and 20.36 percent is hydro.  Oil makes up most of the rest, with very small 
shares for nuclear and gas.  As we will discuss below, the system is even more dependent 
on coal in the coal-rich North and Northeast regions.  In other regions hydro generation 
may provide some flexibility; we will discuss the important issues involving the 
incentives of hydro producers momentarily.  But for now, note that a system with nothing 
but coal plants would exhibit a cost curve with an appearance less like the cost curve in 
Table 1 and more like the bottom and right-hand-side axes of Figure 4:  a large region of 
low and fairly flat costs – its small rise accounted for by different efficiency levels of the 
different coal plants – followed by a vertical line as market capacity is reached. 
 
  Note further how a system with such cost curves – and very inelastic demand – 
operates as demand increases and supply tries to keep up.  If and when demand is below 
capacity, market prices will tend to equal the very low marginal costs of the marginal 
coal plant.  The resulting low prices are great for customers, of course, but they provide 
little margin to encourage existing or new firms to invest in the business.  (A common 
policy response is to institute a regime of capacity payments – which the Chinese 
government has proposed – but at this point the system starts to become highly regulated, 
apparently raising the question of the degree to which one is still relying on markets to 
determine outcomes.)  When demand is at capacity, prices may increase a great deal and 
in a highly volatile way:  there is little demand response to these price increases, and the 
short-run supply response is small as well.  As noted above, the Chinese government has 
already shown an unwillingness to allow electricity prices to rise along with coal prices; 
it seems quite unlikely that the government would tolerate high and volatile prices in 
                                                 
13 For the most recent examples, see Amy Lam, “Coal prices hold down power profit,” China Daily, March 
27, 2008, and Steven Mufson and Blaine Harden, “Coal Can’t Fill World’s Burning Appetite,” Washington 
Post, March 20, 2008.  As the latter reports, “China has done little to contain demand.  Indeed, the 
government has limited electricity rate increases for years, encouraging greater use.  Concerned about 
climbing inflation, Beijing on Jan. 10 turned once again to Communist-style measures, freezing electricity 
prices even as coal and oil prices soared.”   12
response to movements in demand above and below capacity levels.  And yet those are 
exactly what would be expected in markets with cost curves like these. 
 
With this background, let us examine the structure of the six regional generation 
“markets” as they are currently configured.  In order to conserve space, we present only 
the flood season capacities; this biases the summary discussions in the direction of 
reducing the apparent dominance of coal.  (Dry season capacities are available upon 
request.) 
 
3.1    The North and Northeast regions. 
 
Tables A1 and A2 show the generation plant level structures in the North and 
Northeast regional markets.
14  Plants are grouped by parent company, and companies are 
then ordered by decreasing regional market share. 
 
The main factor that stands out from Tables A1 and A2 is the overwhelming 
dominance of coal generation in these two regions.  Of 66 generation plants in the North,  
60 are coal fired, accounting for 93.3 percent of flood season capacity.  Five plants (5.7 
percent of capacity) are hydro, and one (1 percent) is oil fired.  Of the 21 generation 
plants in the Northeast, 18 are coal fired, accounting for 86.5 percent of flood season 
capacity, while three hydro plants account for the remainder. 
 
The North and Northeast are coal-dependent regions that will exhibit reverse L-
shaped wholesale electricity cost curves, except to whatever extent the small amount of 
hydro capacity is used in a capacity-shaving manner.  Free, uncontrolled wholesale 
markets seem likely to exhibit large price fluctuations, from slack period low prices that 
return no margin to generation companies to peak period high and volatile prices that 
transfer large sums from electricity consumers to generation companies without having 
much output increasing effect in the short run. 
 
3.2  The Northwest and Central regions. 
 
Tables A3 and A4 show the generation plant level structures in the Northwest and 
Central regional markets. 
 
The Northwest and Central regions are made up entirely of coal and hydro 
generation plants.  In the Northwest, coal accounts for 65.5 percent of generation capacity 
in the flood season and 88.5 percent in the dry season; in the Central region, home of the 
Three Gorges dam, coal’s shares are 48.5 percent in the flood season (after the promised 
exports of Three Gorges power are accounted for) and 72.5 percent in the dry season. 
 
Let us consider the issue of hydro generation a bit more closely.  In the Central, 
South, and East regions, coal generation capacity is supplemented by a good deal of 
hydro capacity – most famously from the Three Gorges Dam project, but from a large 
(and increasing) number of other dam projects as well (McCormack, 2001).  Hydro 
                                                 
14 Plant level data are obtained from enterprise and government web sites.   13
generation may provide supply-side responsiveness to wholesale electricity price signals 
where water may either be stored directly in holding ponds or pumped back into ponds 
for later release.  Thus it is possible for hydro generators to perform a “peak shaving” 
function that significantly increases the efficiency of the system overall:  they may store 
water when wholesale prices are low in order to release it when prices are high, thus 
obviating the need to call expensive “super peakers” into operation. 
 
  However, there are situations and conditions under which hydro generators cannot 
or do not perform such a function.  They cannot do so when river flows are so high as to 
overwhelm the capacity of the storage ponds – a frequent occurrence during flood 
seasons in many countries.  In that circumstance hydro plants with storage ponds become 
indistinguishable from “run-of-river” plants:  they generate power as the river flows.  
They do not or may not do so when they are not provided with the incentives to do so.  
This may occur under a variety of circumstances: 
•  When government-owned hydro plant managers are not rewarded for profit 
maximizing behavior (which seems to occur most often when governments decide 
to allocate low-cost hydro to particular end users for political reasons); 
•  When, on the contrary, hydro plant managers are maximizing profits, but they 
enjoy market power and so have incentives to allow prices to increase;
15 and 
•  When, and to the degree that, releases of water for hydro generation are 
constrained by irrigation requirements and/or restrictions regarding reservoir 
levels and changes.
16 
One indicator of the likely lack of hydro flexibility in the flood season in China is that 
policymakers have already determined that almost one-third of the electricity output from 
the Three Gorges project during flood season will be exported from the Central region to 
the South and East regions. 
 
Returning to Tables A3 and A4, it is clear – especially in the Central region, and 
especially in the flood season – that the incentives and freedom of maneuver faced by 
hydro generation companies will be crucial determinants of the performance of wholesale 
electricity markets.  If hydro producers are willing and able to shave wholesale price 
peaks, prices will behave with a good deal more stability and predictability than if they 
are not. 
 
Note, however, two possible sources of additional concerns regarding competitive 
conditions in these markets.  First, despite stated government reform policies to the 
contrary, a single firm, the China Power Investment Corporation, holds over 30 percent 
of Northwest regional generation capacity in the flood season.  Similarly, even after 
accounting for mandatory exports, the China Three Gorges Project Corporation holds 
about one quarter of Central regional generation capacity in the flood season.  To the 
extent that these two firms have the ability to affect the timing of their releases of water, 
they may have the incentive to allow prices to increase during periods of peak demand 
and enjoy the resulting high profits. 
                                                 
15 The interesting literature on this issue includes Kelman, et al. (2005), Arellano (2003, 2004), Førsund 
and Hoel (2004), and Hoel (2004). 
16 See, e.g., Crampes and Moreaux (2001), Edwards (2003), and Atkinson and Halabí (2005).   14
 
Second, in the Central region, three generation companies hold capacity portfolios 
with a mix of coal fired and hydro plants:  China Guodian Corporation, China Datang 
Corporation, and China Power Investment Corporation.  If and when these hydro plants 
have no flexibility, this mix will not create anticompetitive incentives.  However, if and 
when they are flexible, their owners may enjoy the incentives discussed earlier to reduce 
hydro production at the margin in order to raise market price and create inframarginal 
rents for the baseload coal plants.  Again, this is in addition to similar incentives that may 
accrue to CPIC in the Northwest and Three Gorges in the Central region as a result of 
their relatively high single-firm market shares. 
 
3.3  The South and East regions 
 
Tables A5 and A6 show the generation plant level market structures in the South 
and East regions.  These two regions have the most diverse generation portfolios, 
including in both cases some nuclear capacity and some oil and/or gas fired capacity.  
Still, coal accounts for 81 percent of flood season generation capacity in the South, and 
(baseload) nuclear another 5 percent; it is only in the South that hydro’s large share 
combines with a bit of oil and gas to reduce the share of coal to 55 percent (with nuclear 
at 6 percent).  In neither region do peaking plants powered by oil or gas seem likely to 
have sufficient capacity to give much gradual rise to the market-wide generation cost 
curve; as in the Northwest and (especially) Central regions, most flexibility, if it exists, 
will come from hydro. 
 
Furthermore, in the South there are multiple generation companies that hold 
mixed technology portfolios that may create incentives to reduce output at peaking plants 
in order to generate inframarginal profits at baseload plants; these include China 
Huaneng, China Datang, China Huadan, and the State Development and Investment 
Company, with their mixes of coal and hydro, and the Guangdong Yudean and Shenzhen 




The analysis presented here suggests that, as currently designed, and for reasons 
of both technology and producer incentives, uncontrolled Chinese generation markets are 
likely to exhibit both high and volatile prices – an outcome that the Chinese government 
has thus far been unwilling to permit. 
 
A number of ameliorative measures could be considered.  Markets where a single 
firm has a large share of generation capacity may be more likely to operate competitively 
if that firm is divested of one of its existing plants; this type of deconcentration strategy 
had some success in the UK, where the initial unbundling of the market created 
generation companies with market power (Newbery, 1999).  Similarly, the potentially 
anticompetitive incentives created by mixing baseload and peaking plants under the 
ownership of a single firm could be removed by dividing such firms into single-
technology enterprises.  Of course, there may be economies of scale deriving from one   15
firm’s ownership of multiple plants, and the ownership of plants with varying 
technologies should diversity some risk borne by the firm; we take no position on 
whether these costs may outweigh any procompetitive benefit of restructuring along these 
lines. 
 
Especially to the degree that market difficulties are caused by the dominance of 
coal in particular regions, this problem may be addressed by increased investments in 
long-distance transmission capacity that makes power generated from other sources 
available to a particular regional market.  As noted above, investments like this are 
already taking place, but there is still a long way to go if significant geographic barriers 
to interregional power flows are to be reduced.
17 
 
Similarly, to the degree that coal price increases are the result of bottlenecks in 
rail transport, the ongoing investments in rail infrastructure improvement may help to 
address such problems.  However, as with the electricity sector, investments in the 
Chinese railway sector must work hard just to keep up with economic growth, much less 
to ease bottlenecks (Pittman, 2004). 
 
Increases in nuclear generation capacity would help to address concerns about 
greenhouse gas emissions and other air pollutants, but since nuclear plants are baseload 
capacity and extremely inflexible, this would not address many of the problems 
addressed here.  On the other hand, further development of natural gas generation, 
including generation from coastal plants powered by imported LPG, could insert more 
flexibility into these markets. 
 
Finally, long-term contracts between generation companies and either large 
industrial users or local distributors generally have the effect of reducing the incentives 
for the generation companies to manipulate output and prices in spot markets.
18  (On the 
other hand, long-term contracts may under some circumstances facilitate collusion among 
generation companies.)
19  And increases in real-time metering for large customers may 
increase the elasticity of demand in wholesale markets and thus reduce the returns to 
output reduction. 
 
More broadly, the analysis presented here would seem to suggest that it may be a 
long time before the Chinese government allows completely free wholesale electricity 
prices – and, more broadly still, that such hesitation would reflect not only political but 
also economic realities:  it is not at all clear that, for a commodity as basic and important 
as electricity, uncontrolled prices that fluctuate wildly without having much short-term 
impact on either demand or supply enhance anyone’s welfare.  Whether the ameliorative 
policies suggested here will be sufficient to address these problems, or whether a 
                                                 
17 Peyrouse (2007) reports hopes and plans for future imports into China of power generated in Central 
Asia, especially hydro power, but this remains only a long-term prospect.  Evans, et al. (2008) and Valeri 
(2008) discuss the welfare benefits of increasing transmission capacity across existing geographic markets 
in, respectively, New Zealand and Great Britain/Ireland. 
18 See, e.g., Kelman, et al. (2005), Bushnell, et al. (2007), and Anderson and Hu (2008). 
19 See, e.g., Harvey and Hogan (2000) and Green and Le Coq (2007).   16
reconsideration of the entire electricity restructuring strategy is called for, would seem 
appropriate topics for further debate. 
   17




Anderson, Edward J., and Xinmin Hu, “Forward contracts and market power in an electricity 
market,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 26 (2008), 679-694. 
 
Arellano, M. Soledad, “Diagnosing and Mitigating Market Power in Chile’s Electricity Industry,” 
University of Cambridge, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics CWPE 0327, 2003. 
 
_____, “Market Power in Mixed Hydro-Thermal Electric Systems,” working paper, Universidad 
de Chile, April 2004. 
 
Armington, Elizabeth, Eric Emch, and Ken Heyer, “The Year in Review:  Economics at the 
Antitrust Division, 2005-2006,” Review of Industrial Organization 29 (2006), 305-326. 
 
Atkinson, Scott E., and Claudia Elizabeth Halabí, “Economic Efficiency and Productivity Growth 
in the Post-Privatization Chilean Hydroelectric Industry,” Journal of Productivity Analysis 23 
(2005), 245-273. 
 
Berrah, Noureddine, Ranjit Lamech, and Jianping Zhao, “Fostering Competition in China’s 
Power Markets,” World Bank discussion paper, 2001. 
 
Borenstein, Severin, and James B. Bushnell (1999), “An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for 
Market Power in California’s Electricity Industry,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 47, 285-323. 
 
_____, _____, and Christopher R. Knittel (1999), “Market Power in Electricity Market:  Beyond 
Concentration Measures,” working paper PWP-059r, Program on Workable Energy Regulation 
(POWER), University of California Energy Institute, February. 
 
Brandt, Loren, Thomas G. Rawski, and John Sutton, “China’s Industrial Development,” in Brandt 
and Rawski, eds., China’s Great Economic Transformation, Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. 
 
Bushnell, James B., Erin T. Mansur, and Celeste Saravia, “Vertical Arrangements, Market 
Structure, and Competition:  An Analysis of Restructured U.S. Electricity Markets,” NBER 
working paper 13507, October 2007. 
 
China State Power Information Center, 2004, www.sp-china.com. 
 
China Statistical Yearbook: National Bureau of Statistics of China, www.stats.gov.cn/english/. 
 
Crampes, C., and M. Moreaux, “Water resource and power generation,” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 19 (2001), 975-997. 
 
Deng, Fei, and Gregory K. Leonard, “Incentives and China’s New Antimonopoly Law,” Antitrust 
(spring 2008), 73-77. 
 
Development Research Center of the State Council of the P.R.C., “Strategies for China’s 
Electricity Reform and Renewable Development,” (China Sustainable Energy Program, The   18
David and Lucile Packard Foundation in Partnership with The Energy Foundation), Industrial 
Economics Research Department, 2002. 
 
Edwards, Brian K., The Economics of Hydroelectric Power, Northampton, MA:  Edward Elgar, 
2003. 
 
Evans, Lewis, Graeme Guthrie, and Steen Videbeck, “Assessing the Integration of Electricity 
Markets Using Principal Component Analysis:  Network and Market Structure Effects,” 
Contemporary Economic Policy 26 (2008), 145-161. 
 
Førsund, Finn R., and Michael Hoel, “Properties of a non-competitive electricity market 
dominated by hydroelectric power,” Memorandum No. 07/2004, Department of Economics, 
University of Oslo, 2004. 
 
Gnansounou, Edgard, and Jun Dong, “Opportunity for inter-regional integration of electricity 
markets:  the case of Shandong and Shanghai in East China,” Energy Policy 32 (2004), 1737-
1751. 
 
Green, Richard, and Chloe Le Coq, "The Length of Contracts and Collusion," working paper 
CSEMWP-154, Center for the Study of Energy Markets, February 2007. 
 
GETRC, Guangdong Electric Power Development and Future Trends, Guangdong Energy 
Techno-economic Research Center, 1999. 
 
Harvey, S. and W. Hogan, “California electricity prices and forward market hedging,” working 
paper, Harvard University, 2000. 
 
Hoel, Michael, “Electricity prices in a mixed thermal and hydropower system, Memorandum No. 
28/2004, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, 2004. 
 
IEA, China’s Power Sector Reforms:  Where to Next?  Paris:  International Energy Agency, 2006. 
 
Kelman, Rafael, Luiz Augusto N. Barroso, and Mario Veiga F. Pereira, “Market Power 
Assessment and Mitigation in Hydrothermal Systems, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 16:3 
(2001), 354-9. 
 
Lien, Jeffrey, “Electricity Restructuring:  What Has Worked, What Has Not, and What Is Next,” 
Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, EAG Discussion 
Paper EAG 08-4, April 2008. 
 
McCormack, Gavan, “Water Margins:  Competing Paradigms in China,” Critical Asian Studies 
33 (2001), 5-30. 
 
NDRC, Annual Report 2002, Beijing:  National Development and Reform Commission, 
www.sdpc.gov.cn. 
 
Newbery, David M., Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities, 
Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1999. 
 
Oakes, Tim, “Building a Southern Dynamo:  Guizhou and state power,” China Quarterly 178 
(2004), 167-187.   19
 
Peyrouse, Sebastien, “The Hydroelectric Sector in Central Asia and the Growing Role of China,” 
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5 (2007), 131-148. 
 
Pittman, Russell, “Vertical Restructuring (or Not) of the Infrastructure Sectors of Transition 
Economies,” Journal of Industry Competition & Trade 3 (2003), 5-26. 
 
_____, “Chinese Railway Reform and Competition:  Lessons from the Experience in Other 
Countries,” Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 38 (2004), 309-332. 
 
_____, “Restructuring the Russian Electricity Sector:  Re-creating California?”, Energy Policy 35 
(2007a), 1872-1883. 
 
_____, “Make or buy on the Russian railway?  Coase, Williamson, and Tsar Nicholas II,” 
Economic Change and Restructuring 40 (2007b), 207-221. 
 
Que, G., "Electricity retail price: cross-subsidies and international comparison and reforms", 
Electric Technical Economics 2 (2003). 
 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Energy Conditions and Policies,” 
Information Office, December 2007. 
 
SPC, Annual Report 2002, Beijing:  State Power Corporation, www.sp.com.cn. 
 
Valeri, Laura Malaguzzi, “Welfare and competition effects of electricity interconnection between 
Great Britain and Ireland,” working paper, Economic and Social Research Institute (Dublin), 
January 2008. 
 
Wang, X., Chai, G., “Review of Economic Policy in the Electricity Industry During the 9th Five-
year Plan and Future Prospect”, in SPC (Comp.), Summary of the Electricity Industry 
Performance during the 9th Five-year Plan, Beijing: China Electric Power Press, 2001, pp. 266-
277. 
 
Wen, Xueguo, “Market Dominance by China’s Public Utility Enterprises,” Antitrust Law Journal 
75 (2008), 151-171. 
 
Wolak, Frank A., and Shaun D. McRae, “Merger Analysis in Restructured Electricity Supply 
Industries:  The Proposed PSEG and Exelon Merger (2006),” working paper, Department of 
Economics, Stanford University, November 2007. 
 
Wu, J.,Y. Yang and B. Sun, "Discussion on the issues of the electricity industry in the 11th five-
year plan", Electric Technical Economics 1 (2004). 
 
Xu, Shaofeng, and Wenying Chen, “The reform of electricity power sector in the PR of China,” 
Energy Policy 34 (2006), 2455-2465. 
 
Xu, Yi-Chong, Electricity Reform in China, India and Russia:  The World Bank Template and the 
Politics of Power, Northampton, MA:  Edward Elgar, 2004. 
 
Yang, Hongliang, “Overview of the Chinese Electricity Industry and its Current Uses,” 
University of Cambridge, working paper CWPE 0617, February 2006.   20
 
Yeh, Emily T., and Joanna I. Lewis, “State Power and the Logic of Reform in China’s Electricity 
Sector,” Pacific Affairs 77 (2004), 437-465. 
 
Yeoh, Boon-Siew, and Rajesh Rajaraman, “Electricity in China:  The Latest Reforms,” Electricity 
Journal 17 (April 2004), 60-69. 
 
Zhang, Chi, and Thomas C. Heller, "Reform of the Chinese Electric Power Market: Economics 
and Institutions", Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford University, 
working paper, January 2004. 
 
Zhang, Xinzhu, and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, “The Antimonopoly Law in China:  Where Do We 
Stand?”, Competition Policy International 3 (2007), 185-201.   21
 

























State Power Grid 
Company  









Others   22
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Table 1: “Cost Plus” Tariff of a Representative Power Producer in Guangdong Province 
(1999) Yuan(USD) 
Capital cost     
     capital cost by capacity  Yuan/KW  6000 
     interest rate  Percent  10 
     payback period  Year  12 
     annual capital cost  Yuan/KW  880 
     operating hours  Hour  5000 
     Unit capital cost  Yuan/KWh  0.176 
    
Fuel cost     
     coal  Yuan/ton  300 
     coal consumption  Gram/KWh  475 
     Unit coal cost  Yuan/KWh  0.143 
    
O&M cost  Yuan/KWh  0.002 
    
Total cost  Yuan($)/KWh 0.321(0.039) 
Misc. Yuan/KWh  0.018 
Tax & Profit  Yuan/KWh  0.10 
Tariff Yuan($)/KWh 0.439(0.053) 





Table 2. 2002 National Average Prices paid to Power Generators 
 
 $/KWh 
Industry average  0.035 
Capacity built before 1985  0.029 
Capacity built after 1985  0.040 
Vintage 1997 (62 plants)  0.050 
Vintage 1999-2000 (70 plants)  0.043 
Source: NDRC (2002)   24
Figure 3 
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